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Abstract
This article studies the processes of social mobility by the main ethno-generational groups in Britain. We compare the
origin-education-destination (OED) links between the first- and second- generation ethnic minority groups with those of
whites, with a particular focus on whether the second generation are getting closer to whites than do the first generation
in the links, hence becoming increasingly integrated into the socio-economic lives of British society. Using data from the
UK Household Longitudinal Study and adopting structural equation modelling (SEM) methods, we find strong evidence of
first-generation setback, and some signs of second-generation catch-up. Indians and Chinese are making progress, but the
two black groups and Pakistanis/Bangladeshis are lagging behind. The analysis shows persisting ethnic disadvantages in
the labour market in spite of their high levels of educational achievement, and it also shows an emerging order of ethnic
hierarchy, running from Indian, Chinese, black Caribbean, Pakistani/Bangladeshi to black African groups.
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1. Introduction
One of the most important features in contemporary
British sociology is the ongoing debate on the patterns
and trends of social mobility. Is mobility rising, declining
or showing a trendless fluctuation? High levels of social
mobility, in terms of both absolute and relative rates and
in the downward as well as the upward directions, are
usually taken as evidence of a vibrant and meritocratic
society whilst low levels of mobility are emblematic of
a rigid and exclusive society (Goldthorpe, 2013; Payne,
2017; Vandecasteele, 2016).
Social mobility research has consistently shown that
there are marked class differences in educational at-
tainment, occupational achievement and labour mar-
ket earnings in British society. While there is little dis-
agreement about this overall conclusion, there are dif-
ferent views about how social divisions are changing
over time. In the numerous studies conducted over three
decades, Goldthorpe and his colleagues (see, for exam-
ple, Goldthorpe, Llewellyn, & Payne, 1987; Goldthorpe
& Mills, 2008) hold that there is little change in mobil-
ity in British society, in terms of either absolute or rela-
tive rates. A somewhatmore optimistic account is shown
in findings by another group of researchers (Devine & Li,
2013; Heath & Payne, 2000; Lambert, Prandy, & Bottero,
2007; Li & Devine, 2011, 2014; Li & Heath, 2016). While
details differ, a common feature in these studies is the
evidence they provide on signs of social progress, as ex-
hibited by a small but significant rise in relative mobility
rates. A third view is held by economists, arguing that so-
cial mobility is declining in Britain (Blanden, Goodman,
Gregg, & Machin, 2004).
While there are heated debates, a closer look would
reveal greater commonality than difference. Among so-
ciologists, the main issue is whether there are signs of
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weakening origin-destination associations. Goldthorpe’s
main argument is that mobility trends tend to show
trendless fluctuations. But he and Mills also show ris-
ing relative mobility in the analysis of ‘complete tables’,
namely, between male origins and conjugal households
(Goldthorpe & Mills, 2008, fig. 9). This kind of growing,
although limited, openness is also found in Breen, Lui-
jkx, Müller and Pollak’s (2009) analysis of educational
mobility and in Li and Heath’s (2016) study of social mo-
bility (Li & Heath, 2016, fig. 3, panel a). Secondly, it
is noted that the differences between sociologists and
economists aremoremethodological than substantive in
nature: the former use the occupation-based measure
and the latter use the income/earnings-based measure
in examining trends of intergenerational mobility. When
the twomeasures are directly compared, the substantive
findings are not much different (Erikson & Goldthorpe,
2010). Furthermore, by usingMosteller’s (1968) iterative
adjustment method, Goldthorpe showed that ‘analyses
based on five-class mobility tables…capture a stronger
intergenerational association than do quintile family in-
come/earnings tables’ (Goldthorpe, 2013, p. 439, em-
phasis in the original). Thus, in spite of the debates
among exponents of the three theses, the overwhelm-
ing evidence points to the same basic conclusion, that is,
while there are profound inequalities in British society,
class mobility might be on the increase although direc-
tions of income mobility are less certain.
The possibility of a loosening social (class) structure
calls for explanation. Goldthorpe and Mills (2008) at-
tribute this to the rising participation rates of women
in the labour market who compete with men for more
advantaged positions. Breen et al. (2009) suggest that
the welfare system adopted since the SecondWorldWar
coupled with greater provision of educational opportuni-
ties may have reduced the class inequality in educational
attainment in the developed countries although Sturgis
and Buscha (2015) argue that the impact of educational
expansion on social fluidity was both indirect and weak.
Li and Heath (2016) suggest that the rising composition
of ethnic minority members in the population may be an
important contributing factor if the minorities do not fol-
low the same pattern of social reproduction as do the
majority group.
The addition of ethnicity as a separate dimension
to mobility research poses a new challenge to the al-
ready complicated analysis but offers a new perspec-
tive. Do immigrants and their children in Britain have
the same opportunities as do the majority group? Do
they suffer greater downward mobility and experience
a ‘perverse openness’ (Hout, 1984, p. 1393)? Earlier re-
search tends to ignore the ethnic dimension due to in-
sufficient ethnic minority samples in the datasets, such
as the National Child Development Study (NCDS) of 1958
and the British Cohort Study (BCS) of 1970, the sources
used by Blanden et al. (2004), and by Goldthorpe and
his colleagues mentioned above. In recent years, more
attention is being paid to ethnic social mobility. For in-
stance, Platt (2005) examined themobility profiles of chil-
dren of black Caribbean and Indian heritages who were
aged 8 to 15 in 1971 using the Longitudinal Study with
linked records from the censuses of population in Eng-
land and Wales from 1971 to 1991, and she found that
black Caribbean and Indian families were less able than
whites to transmit resources to their offspring. Heath
and McMahon (2005) compared the mobility profiles
of Irish, black Caribbeans, Indians and Pakistanis with
white British using data from the General Household
Survey (GHS) for the years 1985–1992. They found that
‘class origins operated in much the same way among
ethnic minorities as they did among British-born whites’
(Heath & McMahon, 2005, p. 411). More recently, Li
and Heath (2016) used data from the GHS, the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the UK Household
Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) to look at the mobility tra-
jectories of the main ethnic minority groups in Britain
over four decades from the 1980s to the 2010s. They
found that black Africans and Pakistanis/Bangladeshis
faced even greater disadvantages than Platt (2005) found
for black Caribbeans and Indians. These and other stud-
ies in this regard have provided significant insights to the
origin-destination associations of the ethnic minorities
in Britain. Yet they do not show how education medi-
ates the origin-destination association, whether the role
is similar for ethnic minorities as for whites, or whether
the impact is stronger for the second than for the first
generation. Given this, the present study seeks to make
a contribution to scholarship in this regard by examin-
ing the ethno-generational differences in social mobility
processes in contemporary UK society, namely, how the
origin-destination association is mediated via education.
Addressing issues of ethnic mobility processes is ar-
guably more difficult than that on the general popula-
tion. Firstly, there is the distinction between migration
and ethnicity to be made and, secondly, there is the mul-
tiplicity issue to consider as ethnic minority groups are
frequently found to be more different from one another
than they are as a whole from the white majority. Thus,
addressing issues of ethnic integration requires investi-
gation of how the ‘fates’ of different groupings change
over time and/or across generations in terms of the inter-
play between family origin, educational attainment and
labour-market (occupational) destination.
Figure 1 suggests a framework of analysis for ethno-
generational social mobility in terms of origin, education
and destination (OED) relations. The solid thick line rep-
resents the majority group (white British in the present
case), the thin line represents the first-generation, and
the dashed line represents the second-generation, eth-
nic minority groups. In the origin-education (OE) rela-
tions, the lines for the first- and the second- genera-
tion groups are set close to each other and to that of
whites on the assumption that the educational attain-
ment of the two generations and of whites would be
similarly affected by family origins: parents tend to use
whatever socio-economic resources at their command to
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Figure 1. The OED moderated by ethno-generational status. Notes: First generation (G1) refers to ethnic minority respon-
dents who were foreign born and who arrived in the UK at age 13 or older. Second generation (G2) refers to those who
were UK born or who arrived in the UK by age 12. The lines for the first and the second generation ethnic minorities are
placed outside of those for whites for convenience but the distances between the G1 and G2 lines with the white lines
indicate the degree of integration.
help with their children’s schooling and it is class, rather
than ethnicity or nativity, that will play a predominant
role in this regard. The extent to which this assumption
will be borne out in reality is an empirical matter de-
pending on the interplay between micro-level decision-
making and macro-level economic conditions and em-
ployer preferences (for a discussion see Li, 2018). For
the ED and OD relations, there is reason to believe that
the two generations will have quite different trajectories,
with the first generation to face more disadvantages in
translating their educational qualifications into occupa-
tional achievement but the second to follow the major-
ity groupmore closely. Immigrants tend to have overseas
qualifications unrecognised by British employers, their
parental resources are less functional in helping themob-
tain good jobs and, coming from developing countries,
their parental resources are not expected to bear resem-
blance with those of whites. Overall, the immigrant gen-
eration are expected to have weaker associations in the
ED and the OD relations than do themajority group, as is
implied by the wider gaps between the first-generation
and thewhite lines than between the second-generation
and the white lines.
However, it can be expected that the first-generation
setbackswill be largely avoided by the second generation
who were born in the country or who arrived as children,
and are thus raised and educated in the UK. Unlike their
parental generation who might have a ‘sojourner’ orien-
tation to their stay in Britain and may cherish the hope
of returning to their country of origin, the second genera-
tion have a different orientation. For them, theUK is their
country, English is their mother tongue, and British ed-
ucation is their passport to labour market achievement.
Furthermore, unlike their parental generation whose mi-
gration process has disrupted their social networks with
friendship ties left behind in the country of origin, the
second generation will make friends with school mates,
neighbours and others in the social circles just like their
majority peers, with both bonding and bridging social
capital to help them with their work and personal lives.
In short, the human-social-economic capital of the sec-
ond generation is expected to yield the essentially same
returns to their occupational attainment as it does for
whites. Even if there might be lingering disadvantages
against the second generation, these can be expected to
be negligible as compared with those faced by the first
generation (Heath & Li, 2008). Given these and other
factors in favour of the second vis-à-vis the first genera-
tion, we may expect the second-generation to resemble
whites in their educational and occupational attainment,
or at least have ED and OD links much closer to whites’
than to those of the first generation co-ethnics, as shown
in the framework of Figure 1.
The distinction made in the foregoing discussion be-
tween the first and the second generation makes con-
ceptual sense, but existing studies do not usually make
such differentiations. On the whole, existing research
suggests that ethnic minorities suffer marked disadvan-
tages relative to whites, in terms of higher rates of
unemployment, especially during recession years (also
called ‘hyper-cyclical unemployment’ in the relevant lit-
erature), lower class positions and lower levels of earn-
ings (Berthoud & Blekesaune, 2006; Heath & Li, 2008; Li,
2010, 2018; Li & Heath, 2008, 2010, in press; NEP, 2007).
Such studies also show considerable inter-ethnic differ-
ences, which exhibit themselves in a more salient man-
ner than those that exist between ethnic minorities as
a whole and whites. Some ethnic groups, such as those
of black and Pakistani/Bangladeshi heritages, are usually
found to face greater difficulties than do other groups.
Given this, we need to differentiate both the main eth-
nic minority groups and the generational statuses.
As mobility research is primarily concerned with the
strength of association between origins and destinations,
an issue that is of central importance for analysing eth-
nic social mobility is whether ethnic minorities, the mi-
grant generation in particular, have lower origin statuses
than do the majority group in the destination country,
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white British in our case. As immigrants tend to come
from poorer countries, we may expect them to have
lower parental classes and lower educational qualifica-
tions than do whites. Existing research has, however,
suggested that most immigrant groups in the UK were
‘positively selected’ not only as compared with their co-
ethnics who have stayed in the origin countries but also
with themainstream population. This may sound surpris-
ing at first sight, but a moment’s reflection would sug-
gest this as an inevitable outcome of the raised thresh-
olds of entry in the wave of the Race Relations Acts since
the 1960s (Borjas, 1992; Feliciano & Lanuza, 2017; Heath
& Brinbaum, 2014; Ichou, 2014; Li & Heath, 2008). But
the labour market setbacks they typically face would put
them into lower class positions and poorer economic sit-
uations (Li, 2018), which would result in a lower starting
point for the second generation. In such circumstances,
the second generation may not follow white children
in educational and occupational attainment. Empirical
findings in this regard are inconclusive. Some studies
have found the second generation faring better in ed-
ucation than do whites (Lessard-Phillips & Li, 2017; Li,
2018), similarly well in occupational attainment (Cheung
&Heath, 2007) butworse in avoidance of unemployment
(Li & Heath, 2008, 2016). An explanation for the second-
generational educational success is provided in terms of
‘reinvigorated aspiration’ (Li, 2018), that is, parental de-
pressed class would push them to redoubled efforts lead-
ing to higher levels of educational attainment as a pre-
emptive strategy against the possible discrimination in
the labour market. Overall, while there has been consid-
erable research on separate OE, ED and OD links, no anal-
ysis is currently available that addresses the three links
simultaneously for the ethno-generational groups in con-
temporary British society.
Summarising the discussion above, we wish to ad-
dress the following questions in the present study:
• Do class origins exert the same influences on the
educational and occupational attainment of the
ethno-generational groups as for the white major-
ity in Britain?
• Do the second generation experience greater sim-
ilarity to whites than do the first generation in ed-
ucational and occupational attainment? and
• Do men and women of ethnic minority back-
grounds have similar experiences to their white
peers in the OED trajectories?
2. Data and Methods
To address these questions, we use data from the first
three waves of the UKHLS which has a large general pop-
ulation sample and an ethnic boost sample, enabling us
to differentiate detailed ethno-generational groups, and
which also contains rich information on parental socio-
economic position and respondents’ own educational
and occupational attainment. The data allow us to disag-
gregate the socialmobility trajectories of different ethno-
generational and gender groups simultaneously, and to
test whether processes of social reproduction operate
for the majority and for different ethno-generational mi-
nority groups in a similar fashion. The survey started in
2009 and is the successor to the BHPS. From Wave 2
onwards, the BHPS respondents were ‘rolled’ into the
UKLHS and their information is included in this analysis.1
For origin and destination, we adopt both class
and status approaches. With regard to the former, we
coded parental and respondent’s class using the seven-
category National Statistics Socio-economic Classifica-
tion (NS-SEC) schema: (1) higher salariat (higher-grade
professionals and managers), (2) lower salariat (lower-
grade professionals and managers), (3) intermediate
(clerical and other routine non-manual workers of higher
grades), (4) small employer and own account (exclud-
ing professionals), (5) lower supervisory and technical
workers, (6) semi-routine, (7) routine workers. Includ-
ing mother’s class is important given recent research ev-
idence (Beller, 2009; Li & Devine, 2011). For parental
class, we followed a variant of the dominance approach
(Erikson, 1984) which takes the higher of father’s or
mother’s class position if both parents’ class information
is available (which is usually father’s position), or the non-
missing parent’s class position if only one parent’s occu-
pational information is available. The class measure is
used in addressing issues of class advancement or de-
cline by the ethno-generational groups.
As for socio-economic status, we used information
on both parents’ and respondents’ job titles and turned
them into standard International Socio-Economic Index
(ISEI) scores following the conversion programme de-
signed by Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Treiman (1992).
With regard to parental socio-economic status scores,
we first coded father’s and mother’s ISEIs and then used
the Euclidian method2 to derive the family status, which
can more accurately capture the advantages and disad-
vantages of different types of family, such as dual- over
single- career families, in terms of the socio-economic-
cultural resources in their possession. For instance, the
resources of one family where both parents were in se-
nior (professional ormanagerial) salariat positionswould
bemuch greater than those of another family where one
parent was in a senior salariat position but the other was
a cleaner or shop assistant or non-employed, or where it
was a single-parent family with, say, the mother working
as a nurse. Using the dominance class approach would
yield the same level of family class but with the Euclidian
approach, the differences between them can be brought
1 The response rates are high, at around 80% for the general population sample and 70% for the ethnic minority boost sample; see UK Data (n.d.).
2 Using the Euclidian method, the parental socio-economic status is defined as the square root of the sum of the squares on each parent’s ISEIs when
both parents’ scores are available (sqrt of (father’s ISEI^2 + mother’s ISEI^2)) or the available score for one parent. As black Caribbean women are
more likely to form single-parent households in Britain and as they are also frequently found to work as nurses in the NHS, using the dominance class
approach would inflate the family resources they have relative to dual-career high-salariat families.
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into much sharper relief. The parental and respondent’s
status scores are used in assessing the OED relations via
the structural equation modelling (SEM) method.
With regard to ethnicity, we follow the standard prac-
tice of ethnic studies in Britain and include white, black
Caribbean, black African, Indian, Pakistani/Bangladeshi,
Chinese, and ‘Other’. As the main purpose in the article
is to assess the ethnic integration, whites are used as
the reference group for whom no generational divisions
are further differentiated. Lessard-Phillips and Li (2017,
p. 49) differentiated six generational groupings for white
British and white Irish each, and five generational group-
ings for white Other, in their study of educational attain-
ment; and Li and Heath (2008, 2010, 2018) also differ-
entiated different white groupings (although not gener-
ational ones) in their study of long-term risks of unem-
ployment, access to salariat positions and labour-market
earnings, and found increasing convergence among the
three groupings. Given this, whites in all generations are
used as one broad group. The ‘Other’ group in our ethnic-
ity variable is very diverse in composition, and we do not
differentiate generations for them either. As for genera-
tional status, we define the first generation as those born
outside the UK and arriving at age 13 or older, and the
second generations as those born in the UK or arriving
by age 12 on the grounds that, unlike the former, the lat-
terwould have receivedmost (or all) of their education in
Britain, and would acquire the same kind of human capi-
tal and have fluent English as whites. Higher generations
are included in the second for each of the main ethnic
minority groups (for detailed information on ethnic gen-
erations, see Lessard-Phillips & Li, 2017). It is noted here
that the first generation are not necessarily the parents
of the second generation. Finally, in this regard, we need
to bear in mind that while some ethnic groups tend to
have stronger community ties which may foster higher
levels of ‘ethnic capital’ conducive to children’s educa-
tional attainment (Modood, 2004), the bonding ties may
also place a particular emphasis on tradition and culture
leaving a negative impact on female participation in the
labour market (Portes, 1998). Given the complex inter-
play between ethno-generational and gender divisions,
we conduct the analyses for men and women separately.
We confine our study to respondents aged 16 to 65 for
men and 16 to 63 for women. The sample sizes for the
seven ethnic groups are 36,503, 891, 1,140, 1,722, 1,895,
268 and 1,913 respectively.
Our main concern with the ethno-generational so-
cial mobility in Britain includes two sub-themes: net so-
cial mobility between parents’ and respondents’ class
positions, and origin-destination associations as medi-
ated by education. To address the first issue, we use
the net dissimilarity index (NDI) designed by Lieberson
(1975; for application in mobility research see also Li &
Heath, 2016):
The NDI is defined as NDxy = pr(X > Y) − pr(Y > X)
and further defined as
n
􏾜
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⎛
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where, in our case, X indicates the parental class position
and Y that of the respondent. It is noted here that we re-
versed the class order in calculating the NDI with 1 refer-
ring to the routine manual and 7 to the higher salariat.
Mobility researchers tend to use the dissimilarity in-
dex (DI) which shows the percentage of cases that would
have to be reallocated to make the two distributions
identical as a measure of the overall difference between
two distributions. Yet the DI is insensitive to ordering and
does not provide any directional statement about the
differences between father’s and respondent’s classes.
The NDI, however, does provide a directional statement
about class decline or advancement, with a positive
value indicating net upward, and a negative value indicat-
ing net downward, mobility. The range of the NDI is from
−1 to 1 in Lieberson’s original article but is here rescaled
to range from −100 to 100 so that the scales could be
understood akin to percentage-point differences. To ad-
dress the second issue we use SEM with parental and
respondent’s ISEI scores to represent origin and destina-
tion status positions. For education, we follow Duncan
(1968, p. 92) in using levels rather than years of educa-
tion and we code an eight-way variable: (1) no formal
education, (2) primary, (3) GCSE (O-Level) or equivalent,
(4) incomplete A-Level, (5) A-Level or equivalent, (6) sub-
degree, (7) first degree and (8) higher degree (masters
or PhDs).
3. Results
We begin by looking at class and educational distribu-
tions by ethnic groups and by gender. For class, we also
look at advancement or decline as shown in the NDI in
Table 1 based on parents’ and respondents’ seven-class
distributions. As the presentation of all these distribu-
tions would take too much space, we only show the pro-
portions of parents and respondents in salariat positions.
Again, for brevity, we only show the proportions with
(first or higher) degree qualifications by respondents.
The data on degree-level education are presented here
to give an indication of possible mechanism of class de-
cline or advancement. The majority group (white) are
used as the notional reference group in this table even
though only univariate rather than multivariate analysis
is conducted.
The data in Table 1 show two main features: first-
generation class decline, and second-generation catch-
up. Both features are displayed within the overall struc-
ture of class rigidity and ethnic disadvantage of British
society. The features can be better grasped by looking
at the figures for whites for whom 34% of the parents,
39% of male and 36% of female respondents are in
salariat positions, and 23% have degree levels of educa-
tion. With these as benchmark figures, we find a salient
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Table 1. Parental and respondents’ salariat positions (%), net difference index (NDI) for intergenerational class advance-
ment, and respondents’ degree-level education (%) by ethnicity, generation and gender (N = 44,332). Source: The UKHLS
waves 1–3.
(%) salariat
Parents Respondents NDI on class advancement (%) degree+
1st gen 2nd gen 1st gen 2nd gen 1st gen 2nd gen 1st gen 2nd gen
Men
White — 34 — 39 — 1.0 — 23
B Caribbean 23 34 27 35 −15.1 −7.8 21 18
B African 47 57 35 38 −27.7 −22.5 43 31
Indian 40 30 43 53 −10.1 30.1 53 39
Pak/Ban 34 14 24 31 −24.5 19.8 37 26
Chinese 55 24 51 45 −11.7 3.7 65 47
Other 39 46 34 42 −20.3 −11.8 43 28
Women
White — 34 — 36 — −0.3 — 23
B Caribbean 21 30 30 39 1.8 16.7 20 27
B African 46 51 29 31 −33.9 −22.5 31 34
Indian 41 26 33 39 −18.1 22.5 41 32
Pak/Ban 29 15 28 26 −14.2 25.7 19 22
Chinese 58 22 51 42 −21.6 8.5 56 38
Other 40 41 38 37 −14.7 −4.4 38 25
Notes: 1st and 2nd gen refer to first and second generations. For analysis of the NDI, the seven-class schema for parents and respon-
dents is used for each of the ethnic minority groups by generation and by gender. Weighted analysis for this and all other analyses in
this study.
feature of first-generation ‘positive selection’ followed
by subsequent class decline, and second-generation ed-
ucational achievement. The term ‘positive selection’ is
usually used to refer to the socio-economic resources
of movers relative to stayers in the origin country, not
to the majority group in the destination countries. Most
immigrants to the UK come from developing countries
and onemight expect them to have poor family class and
low education. Yet, the data on proportions of parental
salariat and own degree-level education of our first-
generation respondents suggest that they are not only
highly positively selected relative to their compatriots
who stayed in the origin countries but also compare well
with the majority group in the UK. We do not, of course,
have direct evidence on parental and own resources for
stayers in all the source countries from which our first-
generation respondents come, but we do have evidence
on China which renders strong support to the intuitive
thinking.3 Most ethno-generational groupings are, with
the exceptions of black Caribbean men and women and
Pakistani/Bangladeshi women, as likely as or more likely
than whites to have salariat parents and degree-level ed-
ucation. 65% of Chinese and 53% of Indian men in the
first generation have degree-level education, over twice
as high as for white men (23%). The parental class advan-
tage of first-generation men is also clear, especially by
Chinese and black African men, at 55% and 47% respec-
tively, as against 34% for white men. This gives substan-
tial evidence on the immigrant positive selection in the
UK as compared not only with their fellow-countrymen
who have stayed in the origin country but also with the
white British. One might, of course, argue that immi-
grants’ parental salariat position and their own degree-
level education do not carry the same returns to labour
market positions in Britain as do those for whites. This
may be true to some extent. For instance, a farmer in
India may not have as much land as his counterpart in
Britain. But if we take a relative position, in terms of the
proportion of compatriots who do not have similar lev-
els of resources, then it makes sense to say that immi-
grants tend to have better economic resources and hu-
man capital than do their compatriots who have stayed
in the home country and it is this ‘superior’ position be-
fore, coupled with class decline after, immigration which
may well serve as a source of reinvigorated aspiration to
their offspring (Li, 2018).
When we compare the first- and the second- gener-
ation’s parental class positions, we find clear evidence
of immigrant class decline. As our second generation
are those born in the UK or arriving by age 12, their
parents’ class position is indexed by the jobs they were
doing in the UK labour market, hence measured in a
3 For men aged 25–69 in China, only 11% of the parents and 14% of the respondents were in salariat positions (Li, Zhang, & Kong, 2015, p. 25). The
Chinese immigrant men’s class positions were therefore not only much higher than those of their fellow countrymen in China but also higher than
those of the white British.
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way comparable to that of white parents. As compared
with whites, we find that all second-generation groups’
parental class is lower than that of whites with the ex-
ception of black Africans. The immigrant class decline
can also be seen from comparing the first- and the
second- generation’s own class positions. Although both
generations have much higher levels of education than
do whites (except for black Caribbean men and Pak-
istani/Bangladeshi women), their proportions in salariat
positions are generally lower than for whites (except for
Chinese and Indians).
The interplay between parental and respondents’
class positions may present itself as class decline or ad-
vancement, as is captured by the NDI under the mid-
dle columns of Table 1. Here we see clear evidence
of first-generation class decline and some evidence of
second-generation advancement. With the sole excep-
tion of black Caribbean women, all first-generation men
and women in all ethnic minority groups suffered class
setbacks: in other words, they worked in jobs at a lower
level than that of their parents. Amongst the second gen-
eration, Indian, Pakistani/Bangladeshi men and women,
and black African women were finding themselves in
higher occupational levels than their parents. Most of
these features apply to ethnic minority groups of both
sexes to a fairly similar extent although women tend to
have lower class positions and educational qualifications
than do their male counterparts.
The analysis above gives fairly clear evidence of
positive-selection and class setback by the migrant- (and
some advancement for the second-) generation. Yet the
analysis is at a descriptive level. Moving from this, we
now turn to a more formal test, to see how family origin
affects the respondent’s education which in turn affects
their class destination using the SEM method.
In the SEM framework for OED analysis, the effects
of OE, ED and OD links are simultaneously assessed. The
coefficient for the OD link is called ‘direct’ effect, themul-
tiplication of the OE and the ED coefficients is called ‘indi-
rect’ effect, and the sum of the direct and the indirect ef-
fects is called ‘total’ effect. The five effects for the ethno-
generational groups by sex are summarised in Table 2,
all measured as standardised coefficients. By compar-
ing the coefficients of the ethno-generational groupings
with those of whites, we can see whether the strength
of association is significantly different, hence whether a
particular group is successfully integrated into British so-
ciety in the domains under consideration. Similarly, by
comparing the changes between the first and the sec-
ond generations, we can gain insights into whether a par-
ticular group is making significant progress over genera-
tions.4 Our main interest here is to see whether the sec-
ond generation is much closer than the first generation
to whites in each of the links. As ethnic minorities tend
to be younger than whites, we have included age as a co-
variate in all models. Younger cohorts may, for instance,
have benefited from the expansion of higher education
and of salariat class in British society than older ones.5
The data in Table 2 show some important features.
First, when all factors in the models are taken into ac-
count, the effects of education on destination (ED) are
much more salient than the effects of origin on destina-
tion (OD). With the sole exception of second-generation
Chinesewomen, the coefficients on the ED link are highly
significant for all ethno-generational groupings. But we
need to remind ourselves that origin effects are medi-
ated via education and that, in addition to separate ED
effects, there are still sizeable direct and indirect effects.
Thus, the origin effects manifest themselves in a pow-
erful, albeit not always direct, manner since the medi-
ating effects are mostly stronger than the direct effects.
Second, with the sole exception of first-generation black
Caribbean men who have been found to have the lowest
education in Table 1 and who here show a significantly
stronger ED association than for white men, there are no
significant differences in the ED link between the ethno-
generational groupings and their white peers. This, how-
ever, does not mean the education has the same returns
for minorities as for the majority group. As shown in the
emboldened figures, there are significantly weaker indi-
rect and total effects for the second-generational men
and women than for whites, which may explain why the
second-generation members are so much better qual-
ified but have worse labour market outcomes as fre-
quently observed in research. And third, looking at the
generational changes as indicated by italicised figures on
the second generation, we find that second-generation
black Caribbean men have significantly weaker indirect
and total effects than their first-generation counterparts,
as do Indian men’s OE and Indian women’s indirect links.
The mechanisms in these cases may be different. As for
black Caribbean men, it may be the ‘downward spiral’
to the white working class norms and aspirations as dis-
cussed in Li and Heath (2008) which may explain their
greater integration. For Indians, the first-generation class
decline and second-generation success may better ex-
plain their intergenerational advancement and the loos-
ening links over the generation.
The findings on a greater distance between the sec-
ond than between the first generation ethnic minority
groups and whites in the mobility pathways run counter
to the expectations as specified in Figure 1 and also seem
counter-intuitive. For decades, ethnic studies scholars
have been predicting over time and intergenerational
progress in assimilation (Alba, 2005; Gordon, 1964; Li,
2010; Park & Burgess, 1921/1969). So, how do we make
sense of the findings? Firstly, we need to think how
the weaker strength of association comes about. If one
group cannot pass the resources to their offspring as
effectively as another, this would weaken the strength
of origin-destination associations. Duncan (1968), for in-
stance, shows that black people in the US were poor
4 Significance tests in both regards are conducted via the procedure of ‘nonlinear combination of estimators’ (nlcom in Stata) within the SEM structure.
5 I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer and the Academic Editor for this insightful point.
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 270–281 276
Table 2. Standardised coefficients for the OED by ethno-generational groups and sex. Source: The UKHLS waves 1–3.
OE ED OD Indirect Total
Men
White .316*** .456*** .087*** .157*** .239***
G1: Black Caribbean .411*** .732*** .013 .339** .316*
G1: Black African .246*** .424*** .050 .107*** .158*
G1: Indian .248*** .442*** .097* .126*** .206***
G1: Pakistani/Bangladeshi .285*** .428*** .001 .120*** .125*
G1: Chinese .259* .312** .091 .069 .179
G2: Black Caribbean .195* .317*** −.063 .062 −.008
G2: Black African .198 .558*** −.068 .111 .025
G2: Indian .075 .508*** .109 .044 .184**
G2: Pakistani/Bangladeshi .127 .480*** −.020 .066 .043
G2: Chinese .142 .650*** .127 .097 .215
Other .235*** .433*** .074 .109*** −.086***
Women
White .356*** .465*** .066*** .165*** .231***
G1: Black Caribbean .357*** .487*** −.002 .174* .172
G1: Black African .274*** .424*** .141* .116*** .257***
G1: Indian .348*** .548*** .053 .191*** .244***
G1: Pakistani/Bangladeshi .326*** .392*** .201 .128*** .329***
G1: Chinese .298** .381*** .166 .114* .279*
G2: Black Caribbean .096 .451*** −.058 .043 −.014
G2: Black African .219 .364*** .101 .080 .181
G2: Indian .237*** .370*** .041 .088*** .129
G2: Pakistani/Bangladeshi .214** .416*** .024 .089** .113
G2: Chinese .229 .085 .406 .019 .426
Other .247*** .447*** .120*** .111*** .231***
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Significant differences between the ethno-generational groupings and whites (at the 0.05
level or above) are shown in bold, and significant differences between the first and the second generations of a particular group are
shown in italics and placed on the coefficients for the second generation.
not because they were born into poverty but because
they were born black. In this case, advantaged class ori-
gins had less importance for the mobility chances of
blacks than for whites, exhibiting a greater fluidity or
a ‘perverse openness’. Essentially what Duncan is ar-
guing about here is that whilst most blacks in the US
were in very low positions, some would achieve occu-
pational success; but even for these lucky ones hold-
ing professional-managerial positions, their childrenmay
still face higher risks of downward mobility than for their
white peers. Secondly, we need to think about not only
parental position but that of the respondents as well.We
have noted above that most immigrants suffered class
decline and that the second-generation’s education was
on the whole higher and their class position lower than
those of whites. Thus, relative to the first generation,
the second-generation’s much lower starting-point and
still lower end-point would also imply a weaker origin-
destination association.
Finally, we show, in Figure 2, a summary picture
of the ethnic integration trajectory over generations in
Britain. The data chart the changing fortunes of the first
and the second generations starting from parental class
to own education and destination (OED) where we also
include avoidance of unemployment (D1 in the figure) as
part of the labour market position. Unemployment is an
important area of ethnic disadvantage, but it is hard to
integrate this into the SEM framework methodologically.
However, we can obtain the net effects using logit model.
The data are shown for men and women separately.
Figure 2 clearly shows that the ethnic minority
groups suffer in the British labour market. Even though
their family position is generally high, and their own edu-
cation is well above that of whites, they encounter much
higher risks of unemployment and enjoy much lower
access to advantaged (salariat) positions. For instance,
Chinese men’s degree-level education is 34 percentage-
points higher than that of white men but their salariat
occupancy is 7 points lower, net of all confounding
factors which have been controlled for in the mod-
els, with a differential of 41 points. The correspond-
ing figures are 36, 31, 29 and 7 points for Indian, Pak-
istani/Bangladeshi, black African and black Caribbean
men. The first-generation’s class position (D2) would gen-
erally serve as parental class situation for the second gen-
eration, which is much lower than that of whites. Yet,
even though they start from such disadvantaged posi-
tions, the second generation, with the sole exception
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Figure 2. Integration trajectories of ethno-generational groups by sex. Notes:Whites’ values are set at 0 and those of ethno-
generational groupings are expressed as net differences from whites, in terms of percentage points. O: parental salariat
positions; E: respondent’s degree-level education; D1: respondent’s avoidance of unemployment; D2: respondent’s access
to salariat. Parental class, age, age squared and ethno-generational status are included in estimating degree-level educa-
tion, and education is further included in modelling unemployment and access to salariat. All data points except O are
average marginal effects (AME) from the relevant models.
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of black Caribbean men, still manage to acquire much
higher education than white men, only to face higher un-
employment rates and lower chances of career progres-
sion in their own labour market position. The same situ-
ation is found for women albeit to a smaller extent.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
This study analysed the processes of social mobility by
ethnic minority groups over generations in contempo-
rary Britain. We used the OED framework for assessing
whether the ethnic minority groups in their first and
second (or higher) generations experienced similar pro-
cesses of social mobility with increasing social integra-
tion. Drawing data from the UKHLS and adopting the
SEM procedure, we paid particular attention to whether
the second-generation ethnic minority groups would ap-
proximate whites in the processes of social mobility. The
first generation is expected to experience setback due to
language barriers, overseas qualifications, lack of knowl-
edge of local labour market, and overt or covert forms
of racial discrimination but the second generation is ex-
pected to experience no such social exclusion.
Whilst our analysis does show serious setbacks by
the first generation, the second generation’s OE/OD links
and indirect and total effects are rather weak, suggest-
ing significantly greater fluidity than in the white pat-
tern, forming an apparent paradox unpredicted from the
classical theories. Yet, closer reflection suggests that the
patterns thatmanifest themselves are well-grounded. As
compared with whites, ethnic minority families may be
better able to foster upwardmobility just as they are less
able to prevent downward mobility. In other words, eth-
nic minority children from lower family positions would
bemore instilled to performwell in education thanwhite
children from similar origin classes, just as those from
higher family positions would be more likely to experi-
ence downward mobility due to inadequate or less ef-
fective bridging social capital possessed by their parents.
Our analysis does show that in spite of their humble
family origins, the second generation outperform their
white peers in education but their excellences in human
capital do not bring them equal returns to labour mar-
ket positions. With so much higher educational creden-
tials, they are still behind whites in avoidance of unem-
ployment and in salariat occupancy. Further analysis re-
veals that, even among those with degree levels of ed-
ucation, they are significantly behind whites (69% and
76% for second-generation and white men respectively
in salariat occupancy).6
Overall, our analysis, which we believe is the first sys-
tematic attempt at exploring the OED relations for ethno-
generational and gender groups using the most authori-
tative data sources in theUK, shows thatmembers of eth-
nic minority backgrounds have taken a long and bumpy
journey in Britain. There is clear evidence of persisting
ethnic inequality over generations. There are also signs
of a growing ethnic polarisation, as shownby the class de-
clines experienced by both generations of black Africans.
Prime Minister May (2017) said that the continued dis-
advantages by ethnic minorities in Britain must be ‘ex-
plained or changed’. Our evidence shows such persisting
ethnic disadvantages, hence the serious needs for over-
coming issues of social exclusion. This is a challenge for
the government, employers and wider society alike.
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